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WAGES AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM INJURIES
IN THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
IAN GREGORY-SMITH
Empirical studies face severe difficulties when identifying the relationship between
wages and labor productivity. This paper presents a novel identification strategy and
demonstrates that the connection between wages and labor productivity is remarkably
robust even when institutional constraints serve to distort the relationship. Identification
is achieved by considering injuries to professional football players as an exogenous
shock to labor productivity. This is an ideal empirical setting because injured players
in the National Football League cannot be replaced easily because franchises are
constrained by the salary cap. Injuries are shown to play a major role in franchise
success and a tight connection between wages and marginal productivity emerges. This
is in spite of regulatory frictions that serve to hold down wages for some workers. (JEL
J24, J31, Z22)
I. INTRODUCTION
A tight connection between wages and the
marginal revenue product of labor is a funda-
mental result in economic theory (Binmore 2007;
Romer 2011). Yet modern empirical studies tend
to avoid testing the relationship. This is because
observing and measuring the marginal produc-
tivity of labor is usually not possible. Instead,
the literature typically uses secondary datasets
of matched workers and firms to examine differ-
ences in earnings and panel data methods to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity in labor pro-
ductivity (Arai 2003). These studies have pro-
vided indirect evidence that wages may depart
from marginal productivity for particular groups
such as women (Goldin et al. 2017; Hellerstein,
Neumark, and Troske 1999) and Black men and
women (Charles and Guryan 2008). More gener-
ally, workers and firms have been shown to share
rents and estimates of the elasticity of labor are
much lower than under the competitive model
(Manning 2011). This implies varying degrees
of imperfect competition, including search fric-
tions (Richard Rogerson and Wright 2005), spe-
cific human capital (Lazear 2018) or unioniza-
tion (Skovsgaard Aidt and Sena 2005). Nev-
ertheless, other studies argue that competitive
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forces dominate pay-setting even in the execu-
tive labor market where these imperfections are
acute (Gabaix and Landier 2008; Kaplan and
Rauh 2013). Crucially, none of these studies actu-
ally measure worker productivity because they do
not assess the individual’s marginal contribution
to the firm’s revenue.
A small body of work has tried to mea-
sure marginal productivity directly. The approach
requires observations of the firm’s output, the
assignment of a production function so that the
individual contribution to output can be plausi-
bly determined as well as wages paid to the indi-
vidual workers. For example, Scully (1974) esti-
mates marginal productivity of baseball players
by assessing the effect of their performance on
the probability of winning and the elasticity of
the franchise’s revenue to winning. Frank (1984)
estimates the marginal productivity of salesmen
in 13 automobile dealerships based on the num-
ber of sales and the piece rate paid to each sales-
man. Frank (1984) finds that wages are far more
compressed than the variation in marginal pro-
ductivity estimates would imply. Lazear (2000)
uses individual data on auto glass installers to
demonstrate the productivity gains associated
withmoving from hourly wages to piece rates and
notes that workers on average see their pay rise
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by less than the productivity gain. However, con-
firming the relationship between individual pro-
ductivity and individual wages is difficult because
of standard identification issues such as omitted
variable bias and reverse causality. It is unlikely
that all relevant variables determining marginal
revenue product can be measured without error
and in Lazear (2000) there is clear evidence that
the structure of wages impacts worker productiv-
ity. Therefore, a source of exogenous variation in
productivity, together with data at the level of the
individual is necessary to identify the relationship
between wages and labor productivity.
This paper uses injuries to professional Amer-
ican Football players in the National Football
League (NFL) to establish a direct link between
wages and marginal productivity. The NFL
offers unique setting to identify the relation-
ship between wages and marginal productivity.
Injuries occur frequently in the NFL and team
franchises are unable to replace injured players
easily because the NFL operates a hard salary cap
for every franchise in the league. The marginal
dollar value of talent to the franchise is equal
to the marginal change in win probability from
employing the talent multiplied by the dollar
value of a win (Szymanski 2006). Therefore, the
financial impact of an injury is the expected value
lost from the reduced probability of winning. If
the equality between wages and marginal product
holds, the financial loss should be equal to the
injured player’s wage; a dollar of injured talent
is a dollar of productivity lost.
An alternative approach to identification has
been undertaken by Nguyen and Nielsen (2014).
Therein, stock price reactions to the unexpected
deaths1 of top executives are used to estimate
the relationship between executive compensation
and their contribution to the firm’smarket capital-
ization. The authors find that higher paid CEOs
do indeed have higher contributions to share-
holder value. Furthermore, Quigley, Crossland,
and Campbell (2017) show the market reaction to
an unexpected CEO death has increased between
1950 and 2009. This is a strong result but the NFL
setting employed in this paper offers some advan-
tages in terms of identification. First, the inci-
dence of sudden deaths to the CEO is rare, only 81
CEOs died at U.S. firms unexpectedly between
1991 and 2008, whereas there were 1,599 injuries
1. The use of unexpected deaths in post as an identifica-
tion strategy has been used in other empirical settings such as
Jones andOlken (2005) who use unexpected deaths of country
leaders to explain country growth rates.
to active NFL players between 2011 and 2015.
Second, the CEO’s value must be estimated with
reference to the expected cost and benefits of the
incoming replacement. The NFL setting avoids
this complication because the hard salary cap pre-
vents highly paid injured players being replaced
with like-for-like players.2 Third, the stock mar-
ket reaction must reflect only expected productiv-
ity differences between the deceased and incom-
ing CEO. This is perhaps a strong assumption if
themarket negatively prices the uncertainty intro-
duced when the CEO suddenly dies. Therefore,
while shocks to productivity can occur in other
employment settings it is the high frequency of
injuries, together with variation in player wages
and the hard salary cap in the NFL offers specific
advantages in terms of identification. In addition,
unlike some empirical settings, all data neces-
sary for analysis are in the public domain includ-
ing: player wages, contracts and precise statisti-
cal measures of performance, and the market’s
expectation of performance is captured by the
betting odds prior to kickoff.
The following section outlines the relevant
economic theory associated with the wages of
professional sportsmen. One complication is that
institutional features of the NFL, including the
salary cap itself, may affect the market clearing
wage rate for talent. In Section 2.1, the possi-
bility of injury is added to the baseline model
and it is shown that the prospect of injury does
not impact upon the market clearing wage of tal-
ent. However, whether player wages are actu-
ally below, equal to, or above marginal prod-
uct is ultimately matter for empirical examina-
tion. Section 3 introduces the data and presents
descriptive statistics, before the econometric esti-
mation of whether W = MRP in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
II. WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE NFL
Fort and Quirk (1995) is a well-known model
in the literature that captures the essential features
of the NFL labor market. The problem for team
i is to choose a level of talent ti to maximize
2. Even if a franchise is able to reorganize its team in
the event of an injury to, for example the starting quarterback
(QB), with an equally talented QB, it can only free up the
salary cap space to do this by releasing talent from elsewhere
in the team, thereby suffering a loss of productivity from those
players. In practice, when starting QBs get injured it is almost
always the job of the substantially lower paid backup QB to
take the field until the starting QB recovers.
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profits3 𝜋i.
(1) 𝜋i = Ri(wi(ti)) − cti.
The share of talent
ti
T




in a season. The share of wins generates
revenue Ri. Each unit of talent costs c in wages
so team i’s wage bill is cti. There are no fixed
costs. Total talent in the league is fixed at T
units of talent.4 With each team in the league
simultaneously maximizing profits, the laissez-













Each team in the league increases their share of
the talent until the marginal revenues from talent
are equal and equal to the marginal cost of tal-
ent.5 Consequently players receive their marginal
product in wages. Note this does not imply equal
talent shares. In Fort and Quirk (1995), team i is
able to leverage its talent stock to produce more
revenue than team j because it draws from a larger
fan base. A strong-drawing team will continue
to increase their talent stock from weak-drawing
teams until marginal revenues are equalized. This
is the “dominant team” problem or the problem
of “unbalanced contests” (see Borland and Mac-
donald (2003) for a review). A desire for more
3. Profit maximization is the objective typically assumed
in the literature for NFL franchises (Vrooman 1995). Another
possibility is that franchises maximize wins (Késenne 2000b)
subject to a profit constraint (which could be negative if
the owner is willing to bankroll the franchise). While win
maximization is thought to be more appropriate in some
European sports (Garcia-del Barrio and Szymanski 2009),
profit maximization is a reasonable approximation for North
American sports (Zimbalist 2003)
4. It is argued that this is the appropriate assumption for a
domestic league, such as the NFL, that is effectively closed to
international talent (Késenne 2014). This assumption implies
that when a team hires new talent it takes it away from
another team in the league. This assumption is not appropriate
for leagues open to international labor such as Association
Football in the English Premier League where talent can be
easily hired from Europe.
5. An alternative equilibrium condition is discussed by
Szymanski (2006). Therein a strong argument is made that
the choice made by teams in most professional sports is one
over budget for talent and that because choices over budget
are made simultaneously and independently by the teams (à
la Nash-Cournot), teams do not internalize the externality that
increasing their budget imposes on the other team. The result
is that budget choices act as strategic substitutes and marginal
revenues from talent are not equalized. However, for our pur-
poses the simpler “Walrasian” equilibrium (Késenne 2014) is
appropriate as talent supply in the NFL is fixed making teams
much more aware of the externalities that their hiring choices
impose. Additionally, budgets are actually fixed by the Salary
Cap.
balanced contests and less certain outcomes is the
basis for regulations such as the salary cap.
The NFL salary cap constrains choices over
talent with a view to restoring a more equal
distribution of talent. Each team’s annual wage
bill must be below a limit6 determined by a
fraction k of total league revenues ΣR:








equilibriumwages clear below the






. If the cap
C binds on both franchises then talent and wins










impact of the cap on franchise profits is theo-
retically mixed. Because wages are held lower,
profits increase (especially for the smaller fran-
chises) but, as talent is not always able to move
to where it is most profitable, franchises (partic-
ularly larger ones) lose profits to misallocation
(Késenne 2000a, 2014).
The other main regulations with the claimed
intention of promoting competitive balance cur-
rently in operation in the NFL are the reverse
order of finish college draft system and rev-
enue sharing. Under the draft, the worst per-
forming teams from the prior year get the first
choice from the pool of graduating college stu-
dents entering the league. However, the literature
has emphasized the “invariance principle” (Rot-
tenberg 1956), which, in the spirit of the Coase
theorem, argues that the initial allocation of tal-
ent does not affect final distribution of talent
when talent can be traded easily between teams
(although it is debatable whether this is in fact
the case). Additionally, franchises in the NFL
share approximately 60% of their revenue. Quirk
and Fort (1992) show that revenue sharing in the
standard model reduces demand for talent there-
fore lowers the market clearing wage but does
not affect competitive balance.7 Therefore, it is
the salary cap in the NFL which potentially plays
the most important role in affecting competitive
6. The cap is actually a window as NFL franchises must
satisfy cti > C;C = lΣR, l < k. While theoretically, a team
could desire to spend less on talent than allowed by the lower
limit, more often than not, it is the upper limit that binds on
NFL franchises.
7. Alternative models of franchise behavior such as win
maximization as presented by Késenne (2014) show that
revenue sharing increases the clearing rate for wages and
could promote balance.
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balance and the extent to which players’ wages
are tied to the players’ marginal products.
A. Injuries
In Fort and Quirk (1995) the choices over
talent map one-to-one with wins. I now extend
their baseline model to consider the uncertainty
that is introduced when injuries shock the talent
stock. This section also considers the assumption
underpinning the identification strategy that will
be used when estimating the relation between
wages and marginal productivity.
Let team i experience a talent shock due to
injury 𝜇i ∼N(0, 𝜎). Ex ante, teams cannot foresee
injuries to their talent or their rival’s talent so the
expectation of the shock is normalized to zero.
Positive realizations of 𝜇 can be interpreted as
injuries to the opposing team (𝜇i + 𝜇j = 0). In
the NFL, talent is distributed unevenly between
players within a team so an injury to a single star
player could be enough to change the sign of 𝜇.
A team is unable to replenish its talent stock after
the injury shock until the next season because of
the salary cap. The wages of injured players must
be honored and count towards the cap in the NFL.
When i plays j, the probability p that i wins is
affected by the realization of shock. Talent stock
T in the league (after all injuries are realized)
is fixed and normalized to 1. At the start of the
season spending on talent by the teams is equal








Injury shocks reduce the probability of winning
and because wins generate revenue, expected rev-
enue falls. If talent earns its marginal product,
the total injury bill (holding j’s injuries constant)











Equation (5) is the key equality that this paper
wishes to test. With data on injuries and player
wages, the dollar value sitting out due to injury
c∗𝜇 can be observed. While it is not possible




.𝜇 it can be calculated by estimating the
reduction in win probability from injured players
𝜕wi
𝜕ti




. This task is conducted in Section 4.
Identification of the relationship between
wages and productivity is possible because
injuries do not fall evenly upon franchises. In
fact, franchises experience significant variation
in terms of the injuries they receive. Even a single
injury to a star player can have a major impact
on a season. Consider the 2011 Indianapolis
Colts, who lost 14 out of a total of 16 games
when their star QB Peyton Manning missed the
season with a neck injury. In that year, Manning
was paid $26.4M or 13% of the salary cap for no
on field productivity. If Manning’s wages were
equal to his marginal revenue product one would
expect the franchise to lose an equivalent amount
of revenue from having their worst season in
20 years.







𝜇 is that the expec-
tation of the injury shock is zero and remains
zero after conditioning upon the choice of tal-
ent by franchise i, that is E(𝜇i|ti) = 0. In other
words, injuries are assumed to be exogenous to
talent choice.What are the threats to this identify-
ing assumption? First, because the collisions that
occur on the field of play are deliberate actions
one may reasonably question whether injuries are
not also a part of deliberate strategy by oppos-
ing teams. Moreover, it will be seen below that
injuries during the game, particularly to key play-
ers such as the starting QB significantly impact
the likelihood of winning that game. This pro-
vides an incentive to injure opponents and an
incentive to take actions that mitigate the injury
risk. Of course, targeting players for injury is ille-
gal and heavy penalties are imposed for any team
caught doing it. However, there is sufficient ambi-
guity in tackling that a policy of targeting play-
ers for injury could go undetected and anecdotal
evidence suggests that “bounties,” small bonuses
for a knock-out hit on an opponent, was a histor-
ical practice.8 Similarly, player effort, which is
unobserved to the researcher, may correlate with
earnings and injury risk. An issue emerges if high
earning players are injured more frequently than
average players.9 This potentially introduces a
correlation between talent ti and the injury shock
𝜇i. The pool of injured players from which lost
productivity is being estimated could then over
represent highly paid and highly talented players.
8. This was brought to light in the case of the New
Orleans Saints who were heavily penalized for allegedly
offering bounties for players between 2009 and 2011.
Coaches and players involved were given suspensions and the
franchise was fined $0.5m and, more significantly, forfeited
their draft selections for 2012 and 2013.
9. Although the main identifying specification is
restricted to the QB position only.
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To indicate whether or not this is a likely prob-
lem affecting the estimates, two tests are pro-
vided in the Appendix (Supporting information).
Table A1 (Supporting information) performs a
balance test on the control variables, according
to whether an injury occurred to the starting QB
during the game. If such injuries occur randomly,
there should be no significant differences in the
means of the observable variables. All the mone-
tary variables are calculated net of the opposition
so should be zero in expectation, irrespective of
whether or not an injury occurs to the startingQB.
This is indeed the case, for the total amount of
injured money sitting on the bench, the Gini coef-
ficient, the ratio of starting wages to nonstarting
wages and the total wage bill. Additionally, both
in the injured and noninjured groups, the team
plays away from home 50% of the time and there
is no difference in the number of rest days prior
to the match. Crucially, the market is unable to
predict within game injuries as the difference in
the Vegas Spread is also approximately zero for
the two groups. The table also shows the impor-
tance of the injury to the QB. The backup QB’s
passing rating is 16 points less than the starting
QB’s passing rating at the mean.
The second test is reported in Table A2 and
explores the relationship between injuries and
player wages in more detail. Supporting the iden-
tifying assumption that injuries are exogenous to
talent choices, Table A2 finds no robust relation-
ship between injuries and player wages. There
are several plausible reasons why injuries remain
exogenous. With respect to player effort, it is
argued that in a professional sports environment
all players will be exerting close to full effort
due to near perfect monitoring by their manage-
ment. It is for this reason why theoretical mod-
els of sporting contests often abstract away from
player effort choices and focus on varying lev-
els of player talent. So what then of apparent
incentives to injure talented players? First, many
injuries simply occur off the field or are trig-
gered during training and therefore are not the
result of a single deliberate collision by an oppo-
nent. Second, to the extent that opponents may
seek to injure talented players more than nontal-
ented players there is an equal incentive for teams
to protect their talented players.10 Third, play-
ers taking “dirty shots” can expect retaliation by
the more physical players on the field and some-
times a rebuke from their own teammates. Fourth,
10. The reason that the position of left tackle is the
second highest paid position is because their job is to protect
the QB. This is described in detail by Lewis (2007).
players often continue to play through knocks
received during a game and are only diagnosed
with a serious injury after the game. This means
the beneficiaries of an injury to a star player could
be the teams who have yet to play against the
injured player, rather than the team responsible
for the injury. Given that any player can pick up
an injury at any time, both on and off the field
and even after a serious collision with an oppos-
ing player it is very difficult to predict whether
or not an injure will occur, what the nature of
that injury would be and the likely duration of the
injury. Since the market cannot predict injuries, it
is argued that there always remains a substantial
stochastic element to any footballer’s injury.
Section 4 tests whether Equation (5) holds,
although it can be noted here that are reasons
to suspect departures from this equality. In par-




𝜇 < c∗𝜇 = L. If wages are
constrained below the market clearing equilib-
rium due to the salary cap the dollar value sitting
out due to injury will be less than the franchise
revenue lost due to injury. Players may be will-
ing to accept with such terms if playing for an
NFL franchise affords outside earnings such as
lucrative deals for product endorsements. On the
other hand, as entry to the league through the draft
is controlled by the existing player’s union, it is
possible that wages are held up above their mar-
ket clearing rate for some players, for example, in
favor of veteran players at the expense of rookies.
Therefore, whether players earn their marginal
product is ultimately an empirical question.11
III. DATA
An advantage of the NFL setting is that most
of the data necessary for analysis is located
in the public domain. Detailed information on
player wages and bonuses from 2011 to 2015
was collected from spotrac.com. Richard Borgh-
esi (2008) provided the author with data on
11. The extent to which competition is balanced in a







. Since the expectation of the shock
is zero, competitive balance ex ante is unchanged. However,
the variance of the shock will influence the realization of the
distribution of wins. If teams are closely balanced ex ante,
the prospect of injury is likely to reduce balance as injuries
are realized unevenly between teams. If teams are unbalanced
ex ante, the prospect of irreplaceable injured talent could
increase balance ex post as the dominant team has more talent
to lose. However, the focus in this paper is on wages and
productivity rather than competitive balance.
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salaries from 1995 to 2001 which had been col-
lected from USAToday.12 While a player’s com-
pensation can exhibit complicating features such
as signing bonuses and performance incentives
the bottom line is a “CAP number” which is
assigned to each year of the player’s contract
for the purposes of monitoring the franchise’s
compliance with the annual salary cap. It is the
CAP number which represents the opportunity
cost of the player and is essentially sunk by the
franchise at the start of the season. If the player
is injured, and cannot play, the CAP number
remains unchanged for the duration of the season.
Performance data were hand collected from
sports-reference.com. The data are at a high level
of disaggregation. In addition to a large number
of variables which captures team performance in
each game, performance statistics for each player
are available on a game by game basis. For each
season, each player receives an objective perfor-
mance rating based on all the plays they made
during each game in the season. The QB, the
highest paid and most important position in the
NFL, receives a rating for every game according
to a formula that measures their passing accuracy.
Additionally, information from betting markets
can be incorporated to capture the expectation of
a franchise’s performance in each game.
Detailed data on injuries and their duration are
obtained from mangameslost.com for the period
of analysis 2011–2015. Information on games
missed in each season for the period 1995–2001
used in Table 2 is obtained from sports-reference
.com. Caporale and Collier (2015) calculate the
number of man-games lost over the course of the
season due to injuries and use the variable as a
control in a regression of win percentage over an
NFL season, exploring the impact of rebalancing
mechanisms such as the college draft. This paper
adopts a fundamentally different approach by
exploiting data on injuries to individual players
and matching this information to each player’s
wage.
A. Descriptive Statistics
A large degree of variation in player wages
will assist the identification of the causal impact
of a dollar lost to injury on the probability of win-
ning. Table 1 shows mean payments by key posi-
tions between 2011 and 2015. Panel A provides
12. Unfortunately, USAToday has withdrawn their salary
data from the public domain and wage data from 2002 to 2011
is not available.
a breakdown of the different elements compen-
sation by position. In addition, to salary, play-
ers receive additional payments when signing the
contract and making the playing squad. There is
substantial variation between positions. The QB
commands a salary that is, on average, twice that
of the running back. Panel A also shows that
QBs receive more supplements to their salary.
The final column in panel A labeled “Dead Mon-
ey” records the amount charged to the Cap in
the event that the player is cut in that year. Dead
money indicates that the franchise has commit-
ted to paying the player an amount which cannot
be recovered if the player is cut before the end of
their contract.
As well as substantial variation between posi-
tions there is substantial variation within posi-
tions. Panel B shows the breakdown by year of
the CAP hit within team franchises. The stan-
dard deviation on the QBs CAP hit is $5m, more
than twice the mean salary with larger variation
at the top end of the distribution. Consistent with
Rosen’s (1981) “superstar” theory of wages, the
90th percentile QB is paid 10 times more than
the median QB, with the 99th percentile paid a
further 1.5 times the 90th percentile QB. Within
the same position and team, variation is even
greater. The starting QB is paid, on average, 10
times more than the backup QB. If the starting
QB is injured, one can expect a substantial reduc-
tion in the probability that the team wins the
game.
Table 1 also shows inflation in nominal wages
at the mean over a relatively short sample period.
There are small increases in the Gini coefficient
over the same period, implying that the increase
has gone to paying the higher paid players a lit-
tle more. This has occurred alongside increases
in the overall team cap. The overall cap is deter-
mined each year by a formula based on approxi-
mately 48% of total league revenues. If the salary
cap is increasing, it implies aggregate franchise
revenues are increasing. The Cap has increased
substantially since its introduction in 1994 at
$34.6m.
Panel A of Table 2 introduces the second time
period for which data are available and shows the
incidence of injury over the season by position for
the years 1995–2001. Season long injuries occur
relatively infrequently, with only 2.9% of QBs
missing the entire season due to injury. However,
injuries frequently cause players to miss part
of the season. Only 72.8% of QBs manage the
entire season without any injury at all. Injury
rates at other positions are lower, with 79% of
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TABLE 1
Player Wages 2011–2015
Panel A: Mean Wages by Positiona
Position N Salary Signing Roster Dead Money
Offense
Quarterback (QB) 467 $2,094k $1,006k $248k $4,953k
Left tackle 283 $2,044k $629k $162k $3,504k
Running back 697 $1,019k $295k $96k $1,044k
Wide receiver 1,091 $1,133k $416k $106k $1,786k
Defense
Defensive line 748 $1,366k $501k $145k $1,889k
Line backer 738 $1,221k $515k $134k $2,001k
Corner back 973 $1,217k $402k $124k $1,556k
Panel B: Cap Hit Inequality Measuresb
Year Team Cap Mean SD Gini 99by90 90by50 75by25
2011 $120.0m $1,806k $2,410k 0.5679 2.566 6.744 4.659
2012 $120.6m $1,719k $2,441k 0.5818 2.582 7.156 4.036
2013 $123.0m $1,791k $2,513k 0.5885 2.550 7.301 4.167
2014 $133.0m $1,900k $2,704k 0.5927 2.566 7.170 4.444
2015 $143.3m $2,009k $2,842k 0.5984 2.757 7.369 4.620
Pooled $1,843k $2,587k 0.5870 2.665 7.070 4.352
Pooled QB $3,744k $5,075k 0.6352 1.501 10.427 8.519
a“Deadmoney” is charged to the cap if the player is cut. Signing bonuses are paid upon signing. Roster bonuses are conditional
upon making the active roster.
bAll wages in nominal values. 90by50 divides wages at the 90th percentile by the 50th percentile.
Offensive Linesmen to 83.6% of Linebackers
going the whole season uninjured. Injuries to
Punters and Kickers in the Special Teams are
rare.
How has the incidence of injury changed
over time? The NFL has become more con-
scious of “player safety” over the time. Recent
medical research (Mez et al. 2017, 2020) has
documented a high incidence of chronic trau-
matic encephalopathy in the brains of deceased
NFL players. Although the extent of risk asso-
ciated with playing in the NFL is contested by
some studies (Deshpande et al. 2017), Manley
et al. (2017) review the literature and conclude
that multiple prior concussions are related with
depression and cognitive deficits later in life. In
April 2016, a federal appeals court upheld an out
of court settlement between the NFL and concus-
sion lawsuits filed by former players. The settle-
ment is thought to be worth approximately US$1
billion and will cover approximately 20,000 play-
ers. Since 2009, the NFL has introduced a “con-
cussion protocol” and tightened its rules on con-
cussions. However, it is unclear whether this
will increase or decrease the number of observed
cases of injury in the data. While the true injury
risk is likely to be reduced, the recorded num-
ber of injuries might increase because the ability
to diagnose this type of injury has improved.13
Hanson, Jolly, and Peterson (2017) analyze the
“Crown of the Helmet” rule introduced in the
2013–2014 season that made certain head colli-
sions on offensive players illegal. They find that
while concussion reports among defensive play-
ers fell by approximately 30%, lower extremity
injuries for offensive players increased by a sim-
ilar amount. Other restrictions on blocking and
tackling have also been introduced over time to
decrease the likelihood of an injury occurring.14
Referring to panel B of Table 2 which pools
data across the years 2011–2015, the incidence
of being injured for the whole season is 2 per-
centage points higher for QBs compared to the
1995–2001 period. While a small increase in
absolute terms, this is two-thirds higher than the
prior period. It appears the reduced injury risk
has been offset by the increased rate of injury
detection (and perhaps an increased fear of lit-
igation) between the two periods. However, the
13. As of 2016, whenever a potential concussion is iden-
tified the player is removed from the game and an independent
Neurotrauma consultant will examine the player.
14. For example, in 2016, the “chop block,” where a
player blocks another high on the body, while a teammate







Position N N injured Missed 16 Missed 7–15 Missed 1–6 Missed 0
Offense
Quarterback 522 142 0.029 0.081 0.163 0.728
Running back 1,051 187 0.021 0.031 0.126 0.822
Wide receiver 1,102 190 0.018 0.038 0.116 0.828
O Line 2,423 503 0.022 0.043 0.144 0.791
Defense
D Line 1,717 312 0.019 0.026 0.137 0.818
Line backer 1,431 237 0.018 0.030 0.117 0.836
D cover 1,958 335 0.018 0.030 0.122 0.829
Special Teams 261 5 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.981
Panel B: 2011–2015
Injury Frequency
Position N N injured Missed 16 Missed 7–15 Missed 1–6 Missed 0
Offense
Quarterback 349 92 0.049 0.106 0.109 0.736
Running back 574 115 0.017 0.052 0.130 0.801
Wide receiver 796 167 0.013 0.053 0.145 0.790
O Line 1,635 439 0.026 0.072 0.174 0.731
Defense
D Line 1,144 227 0.013 0.047 0.140 0.801
Line backer 991 230 0.019 0.052 0.159 0.770
Cover 1,384 328 0.017 0.062 0.160 0.762
Special Teams 163 1 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.994
Notes: 1. Data on games missed are calculated from sports-reference.com. N counts the number of player-seasons at each
position. 2. N injured counts the number of player-seasons with any injury of any duration. 3. Injury frequency is the proportion
of players who missed any part of X number of games that year. For example, in panel A, only 2.9% of QBs missed the entire
season but only 72.8% of QBs went the entire season without missing any playing time due to injury. 4.O Line comprises guards,
centers, tackles, and tight ends.D Line comprises defensive ends and tackles. Cover comprises safeties and corners and defensive
backs. Special Teams comprises kickers, punters, and long snappers.
likelihood of the QB going the entire season unin-
jured is marginally higher in the later period.
Together, these descriptive statistics are consis-
tent with increased protection of the QB position
so that minor injuries occur less often, but when
major injuries do occur they are treatedmore seri-
ously and force longer absences from the field of
play.
The differences between the time periods at
other positions are not so clear. The rates of sea-
son long injury are broadly similar in the second
period and marginally fewer players go the entire
season uninjured. It would appear that it has been
the QBs who have been the main beneficiaries of
the rule changes that have targeted player safety.
It is clear then that QBs are not only paid very
differently to other players but also experience
injuries differently as well. This motivates a sepa-
rate analysis of injuries and wages to QBs below.
Table 3 uses more detailed data on injuries
from mangameslost.com for the period
2011–2015. Here, injuries are defined as those
that made the weekly injury report declared to
the NFL. The data identify the area of the body
hurt but not the specific diagnosis of the injury or
cause of the injury.15 Duration is calculated by
taking the number of days from being declared
injured until the date of the next game when the
player was available for selection and the mean
number of weeks is reported. Duration is right
censored at 7 days after end of the regular season.
Knee injuries are the most common injuries and
keep players out for a relatively long period of
time, almost 9weeks on average. Only 6.5% of
injuries that lead to missed game time were due
to concussions and these players were rested
for an average of 3weeks. Given the particu-
lar interest in concussion injuries in the NFL,
15. For example, the data did not distinguish between
arm injuries that are bone fractures and arm injuries that are
muscular.






Knee 1,224 21.22 8.85 13.08
Ankle 710 12.31 4.45 6.71
Hamstring 668 11.58 3.22 4.44
Leg 408 7.07 5.48 11.37
Shoulder 380 6.59 5.96 8.55
Concussion 377 6.54 3.27 6.07
Foot 375 6.50 7.25 9.60
Groin 240 4.16 2.81 3.01
Hand 203 3.52 4.72 4.92
Back 174 3.02 5.24 9.04
Chest 158 2.74 5.24 7.50
Hip 132 2.29 7.15 12.09
Illness 132 2.29 4.98 12.19
Neck 103 1.79 6.22 10.64
Undisclosed 99 1.72 12.70 10.48
Achilles 96 1.66 14.11 11.57
Arm 85 1.47 9.44 5.75
Head 84 1.46 2.57 3.51
Elbow 60 1.04 4.41 5.12
Other 60 1.04 3.33 3.26
Total 5,768 100.00 5.95 9.58
Notes: 1. The data are from mangameslost.com and cover
the main period of analysis 2011–2015. 2. N counts the num-
ber of unique injuries to players in the NFL between 2011
and 2015. Percent is the percentage of all injuries accounted
for by the injury type. 3. In 2.7% of cases, two body parts were
identified as injured. To avoid double counting, the injury
was assigned to the first recorded category. For example,
“knee/ankle” was classified as a knee injury, whereas “an-
kle/knee” was classified as an ankle injury.
Table 4 breaks down the concussion injuries by
season for both QBs and non-QBs. Reported
concussions account for a greater proportion of
injuries among QBs and increase over time for
both groups.
B. Injuries and the Probability of Winning:
Game Level
The data allow estimation of the impact of
injuries on the probability of winning at differ-
ent levels of aggregation. A season-level anal-
ysis using data from 1995 to 2001 is provided
in the Appendix. Therein, total injuries of the
course of the season are shown impact the win
percentage over the 16 games of the regular sea-
son. However, a limitation of analysis at the sea-
son level is that it aggregates information across
all the games in the season. Important determi-
nants of match outcomes, such as which team
is playing, the market odds prior to kick off,
whether or not the team is playing at home








2011 58 5.37 3.77
2012 61 5.22 3.62
2013 64 6.40 2.31
2014 67 5.45 3.24
2015 103 9.25 2.27
All seasons 353 6.34 2.94
Quarterback
2011 2 6.25 7
2012 4 12.90 2.92
2013 7 13.33 3.65
2014 3 8.33 5.33
2015 10 21.74 2.28
All seasons 26 13.16 3.76
Notes: 1. Compiled using injury data from mangameslost
.com. N counts the number of concussion injuries to players
in the NFL between 2011 and 2015, where the concussion
placed the player on injury report for at least one game.
Players who were treated for concussion but reported fit
and did not miss any game time are not recorded as having
concussion in the data. 2. Percent is the percentage of all
injuries (in the year) accounted for by concussions.
For the purposes of identification, injuries that
occur to QBs within the game itself represent
the tightest specification. Prior to this, let it be
shown that injuries to all players prior to match
day also have an impact on the likelihood of win-
ning that particular match. Table 5 reports the
game level analysis where each of the 32 NFL
franchises plays 16 games over 5 regular seasons,
2011–2015. Additionally, the wage data avail-
able in the period 2011–2015 are more detailed
than that from 1995 to 2001 because the data
record the official “cap number” that represents
the charge to the salary cap for the franchise over
that season.
For each game, the dependent variable takes
the value of 1 if a win is recorded and zero oth-
erwise. Estimation is by logit and a conditional
logit which controls for team level fixed effects.
Controlling for fixed effects over a 5-year period
should be a reasonably tight specification because
unobservables such as training facilities and fran-
chise culture should not vary a great deal over this
time period. Ln Injured Money (net) is the natural
log of total wages for players who were unable to
play that game net of their opposition’s injured
wages. This variable mirrors the injury shock
c.𝜇i outlined in the theory section above. Table 5
reports the estimated coefficients and marginal




Injuries on the Probability of Winning: Game Level 2011:2015
Logit Logit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln Injured Money (net) −0.31*** −0.19*** −0.12** −0.31*** −0.20*** −0.12*
(−5.63) (−3.21) (−2.07) (−5.33) (−3.31) (−1.96)
Control variables
Starter Gini (net) −0.53 0.0069 −0.70 0.00021
(−1.09) (0.014) (−1.22) (0.00035)
Starter/nonstarter (net) 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.10
(1.52) (0.86) (1.42) (0.72)
Away −0.64*** 0.025 −0.65*** −0.014
(−7.69) (0.25) (−7.63) (−0.14)
Ln Wage Bill (net) 1.27*** 0.49 1.44*** 0.75
(2.86) (1.09) (2.98) (1.51)
Rest Days (net) 0.0026 −0.011 0.0012 −0.011
(0.15) (−0.62) (0.072) (−0.64)
Win %t−1 (net) 1.05*** −0.11 0.80*** −0.20
(8.10) (−0.72) (6.25) (−1.32)
Prior Season Win % (net) 0.75*** 0.078 0.35** −0.11
(4.92) (0.47) (2.03) (−0.61)
Prior Season Super Bowl Win (net) 0.47** 0.19 0.43** 0.22
(2.57) (1.00) (2.22) (1.09)
Vegas Spread 0.14*** 0.13***
(13.1) (11.6)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555
Number of teams 32 32 32 32 32 32
Notes: Estimated coefficients reported not marginal effects. The estimated coefficient of Ln Injured Money (net) in column
1 implies a marginal effect of −0.076. t statistics in parentheses (adjusted for clustering at team level). *p< 0.1; **p< .05;
***p< .01.
The estimated coefficient of the raw effect
of Ln Injured Money (net) in column 1 implies
an average marginal effect (AME) of −0.076. A
one standard deviation increase in this variable
($15.25M) implies a 9 percentage point reduction
in the probability of winning that game (uncon-
ditional). With 16 games in the season, the one
standard deviation injury shock implies losing
1.47 games in the season. To equate wages with
marginal revenue product a single win for the
franchise would need to be equal to $10.4M.
The control variables that play an important
role in win probability include Away, a dummy
which equals 1 for an Away fixture (AME 0.13)
and the total wage bill of the franchise net of
the opponent (AME 0.28) in the relevant year.
Two measures on inequality within the franchise
are included; the Gini coefficient among starting
players and the ratio of the starters wage bill to
nonstarters. However, neither of these variables is
statistically significant. Three variables capturing
the form of the team, net of their opposition are
included: thewin percentage during the season up
to the game in question, the win percentage of the
prior season and an indicator for the prior season
Super Bowl champions. Each of these variables
predicts a win with current season performance
being the most informative.
The most important control variable for the
analysis is the Vegas Spread for each game which
is included in columns 3 and 6. This provides the
market’s expectation of the probability of win-
ning. For each game, an under/over spread is
offered on either team. If A plays B and the Vegas
Spread is +7, then the market is predicting that
A has a 50% chance of winning by 7 or more
points and that B has a 50% chance of winning
or losing by 7 or less. Card and Dahl (2011)
show this variable is an unbiased predictor of
match outcomes and a replication of their test
with this more recent data period is shown in the
Appendix. The estimated coefficient in column
6 implies an extra point on the spread is worth
3% in win probability. As all the control variables
in Table 5 are known to the market prior to kick
off, one would expect them to be priced in to the
Vegas Spread, otherwise it would imply outstand-
ing arbitrage opportunities. As shown in columns
3 and 6, the control variables are no longer predic-
tive of the match outcome once the Vegas Spread
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is accounted for. However, there remains an effect
on the margin of statistical significance for the
main variable of interest Ln Injured Money (net).
This is likely due to some uncertainty prior to
kick off surrounding the extent of injury to some
players. Whether a player misses a game due to
injury is coded retrospectively as a one or zero
and it is not known whether the market gave an
a player who is coded injured some chance of
playing prior to kick off. Potential for measure-
ment error arises in cases of recurring injuries. In
other words, the market is unable to price in all
injuries perfectly prior to kick off. These imper-
fections motivate a more precise analysis using
injuries to QBs during the game itself in the fol-
lowing section.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Injuries and the Probability of Winning:
Within Game Analysis
The most critical position in the NFL is the
QB. They are the highest paid and play a unique
role in the side as they are responsible for play
selection as well as play execution.16 More so
than a captain in association football or a point
guard in basketball, QBs have a major bearing on
the outcome of the game. In their 53 man squad
(roster), a team will employ a starting QB and at
least one and sometimes two or three backup QBs
in case of an injury to the starting QB. As such an
injury within a game to the starting QB represents
the cleanest shock to labor productivity in the
NFL.
For the period 2011–2015, it is observed in
the data whether the starting QB was replaced
by the backup QB during the game. This infor-
mation is cross-referenced to data on injuries
from mangameslost.com where the nature of the
injury and its duration (as shown in Table 3) are
observed. This allows one to exclude instances
of “tactical substitutions,” where the starting
QB is not really injured but replaced by the
backup QB for performance reasons. On occa-
sions, QBs are substituted late in the game when
the contest is already won and these can be
excluded when there is no subsequent reported
injury.17
16. Plays are also designed and selected by the head
coach and offensive coordinator.
17. One limitation is that the time of injury in the game
is not recorded. One might expect an earlier injury to have a
larger impact than a later injury. Table A7 in the Appendix
explores this using match reports from sports-reference.com
Table 6 shows the results. When the backup
QB is required to take the field the team is more
likely to lose by 28 percentage points (AME “In-
jured QB” column 1). Likewise if the opponent’s
QB steps in the team is more likely to win by
28 percentage points. These estimated effects are
equivalent to giving the other team 9.5 points on
the spread. Column 2 confirms that this injury
is not predicted by the market prior to kick-off
and column 3 shows this is unaltered by unob-
served franchise fixed effects. An injury to the
starting QB is clearly a major shock to the fran-
chise.18
Most starting QBs experience variation in
form over their career and therefore their con-
tribution relative to a backup QB is likely to
vary. It is possible to control for how well a QB
played during the game with their official “pass-
ing rating.” Passing rating is measured on a scale
from 0 to 158.3 points for a perfect game.19 The
estimated coefficient on passing rating in column
4 shows how important the QB’s performance
is to the probability of winning. A one standard
deviation increase in the passing rating corre-
sponds to a 19% point increase in the likelihood
of winning. Backup QBs replacing injured QBs
on average have 16 fewer points in passing rating
per game, which equates to 12 fewer percentage
points in the likelihood of winning each game.
Passing rating is capturing approximately half of
the effect of substituting in the Backup QB. Of
course, in any one game a Backup QBs can play
well and help their team win.20 However, given
the same passing rating in the game, an injury to
the starting QB further reduces the likelihood of
winning. It is likely that the weaker passing game
of the backup QB allows the opposition defense
to line up against running plays with greater cer-
tainty, rendering non-passing plays less effective.
for a subsample of QBs and finds that: injuries in all quarters
have a significant impact on match outcome, later injuries are
more common and earlier injuries are not significantly more
impactful than later injuries.
18. “Injured QB” was also interacted with year dummies
to test for variation in the relationship over time. None of
the year interactions were significant. Results available on
request.
19. Four categories are used as a basis for compil-
ing a rating: percentage of completions per attempt, average
yards gained per attempt, percentage of touchdown passes per
attempt, and percentage of interceptions per attempt. A pass-
ing rating of over 100 is considered a very good performance
http://www.nfl.com/help/quarterbackratingformula.
20. Nick Foles won the most valuable player award in
his winning Super Bowl appearance in 2017 as a backup QB
with an excellent passing rating of 106.1, 15 points above the




Injuries on the Probability of Winning: Within Game QBs 2011:2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Injured QB −1.18*** −1.28*** −1.24*** −0.72***
(−6.69) (−6.83) (−6.53) (−2.96)
Injured QB (opp) 1.19*** 1.31*** 1.34*** 0.84***
(6.80) (7.02) (7.14) (3.43)
Vegas Spread 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.099*** 0.099***
(18.6) (16.0) (6.67) (6.68)
Passing rating 0.056*** 0.056***
(19.3) (19.3)
Passing rating (opp) −0.058*** −0.058***
(−19.2) (−19.2)
Δ Injured-Backup QB wage −0.048***
(−2.98)
Δ Injured-Backup QB wage (opp) 0.055***
(3.46)
Control variables
Ln Injured Money (net) −0.019 −0.020
(−0.22) (−0.23)
Gini coefficient (net) 1.02 1.05
(1.29) (1.33)




Ln Wage Bill (net) 0.46 0.45
(0.73) (0.71)
Rest days (net) −0.00019 −0.00044
(−0.0085) (−0.020)
Win %t−1 (net) −0.12 −0.12
(−0.61) (−0.60)
Prior Season Win % (net) −0.20 −0.19
(−0.82) (−0.79)
Prior Season Super Bowl Win (net) 0.35 0.35
(1.38) (1.37)
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555
Teams 32 32 32 32 32
Notes: Estimated coefficients after logit (conditional logit for FE) reported. t statistics in parentheses (adjusted for clustering
at team level). *p< 0.1; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
Additionally, to the extent that the starting QBs
may possess superior leadership skills, are bet-
ter at changing the play at the line of scrimmage
or are better at running the ball themselves, fran-
chises may benefit from these attributes.
There is considerable variation between fran-
chises in the difference in wages between start-
ing and backup QBs and therefore the shock of
losing the starting QB to injury is also expected
to vary. Column 5 examines “Δ Injured-Backup
QB wage” which interacts an injury to the start-
ing QB during the game with the wage dif-
ferential between the starting QB and backup
QB who replaced them. The estimated coeffi-
cient for this variable implies a one standard
deviation increase in the wage differential is asso-
ciated with a loss of 7 percentage points in the
likelihood of winning, conditional upon the start-
ing QB getting injured during the game. For
illustrative purposes, a one standard deviation
in wage differential is approximately $11M at
the median. Therefore, the implied marginal pro-
ductivity for $10M of QB wages would equal
approximately 6.6 percentage points in the like-
lihood of winning each game, or approximately
1 game over the course of the regular season.
Therefore, a win would need to be worth approx-
imately $10M to the franchise in order to equate
median QB wages with their marginal revenue
product. This is almost exactly the same as the
estimates obtained above when adding up the
wage bill of injuries at all playing positions, albeit
the identification on QB injuries is much more
precise.
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As expected, the effects sizes in Table 6 are
symmetric for the opposition variables (none of
the differences in magnitude of the estimated
coefficients are statistically significant). The
control variables act upon the match outcome in
a similar way as in Table 5. The Vegas Spread
remains the most important predictor of the
match outcome, albeit the magnitude, condi-
tional on what the QB achieved the game, is
reduced in columns 4 and 5. This is expected as
the market cannot predict perfectly how a QB
will perform in any one game. After controlling
for Vegas Spread, none of the control variables
are expected to be statistically significant as
all these variables are public information prior
to kickoff. However, a negative coefficient on
Away emerges because the specification requires
passing rating (which is not known prior to kick
off) to be held constant. Because passing rating
is systematically lower when QBs play away
from home, holding this constant introduces
collinearity with Away. If passing rating is omit-
ted, then the coefficient on Away returns to being
statistically insignificant from zero.
Altogether, these estimates imply that an
injury to the starting QB has a major bearing on
the outcome of the match and the impact and
the size of the effect is proportional to the wage
differential between the starting QB and backup
QB. Note that the impact of the amount of injured
money Ln Injured Money (net) is no longer statis-
tically significant after conditioning on the QB’s
performance during the game and the Vegas
Spread. Therefore, the most relevant identifier of
a shock to labor productivity among NFL players
appears to be an injury to the starting QB. As
stated above, the estimates imply that a win will
need to be worth approximately $10M to justify
the marginal difference in wages between the
starting and backup QBs. The next section seeks
to determine whether or not this is the case.
B. How Much Is a Win Worth?
Starting QBs are paid on average approxi-
mately 10 times the amount of the backup QB.
However, it has been shown above that the team
is not 10 times less likely to win without their
starting QB, rather approximately 28 percentage
points less likely to win each game. If the median
8-8 team was forced to go the entire season with
the backup QB they would still be predicted to
win between 3 or 4 games in the season. Such a
team would not make the postseason playoffs but
how much does winning matter for the revenue
of the team? If wages are, on average, equal to
marginal product, the prediction is that the four
to five win difference over the season is worth
the difference in wages between the backup and
starting QB.
While the precise value of a win is likely to
be fairly volatile between franchises it is possi-
ble to obtain a reasonable estimate for the sample
period from data on franchise finances provided
by Forbes. Forbes provided the author with fran-
chise book values for the years 1995–2017 and
franchise revenues for the years 2000 and 2005.
Additionally, revenues and operating income are
currently publicly available on the Forbes web-
site for the years 2008–2017. Table 7 shows the
large increase in mean revenues and book val-
ues experiencedNFL franchises by between 2000
and 2017 alongside the increase in the salary cap.
One complication in estimating the elastic-
ity of revenue to a win is that approximately
60% of franchise revenues are pooled and then
redistributed. This is principally through a col-
lective arrangement to share media revenue.
The increase in revenues observed in Table 7
is predominately driven by media revenue and
the growth in book values is heavily influenced
by the public subsidization of new NFL venues.
Franchises earn approximately 20% of their
revenue from their venue which is unshared
(Vrooman 2012). As there are only 16 games
in the regular season, the elasticity of game day
attendance to winning is somewhat muted in the
short run (see Table A6). This is consistent with
Bradbury (2019) who shows that revenues in
the NFL are insensitive to the current and prior
season on-field performances.
However, over a longer period of time, a fran-
chise can generate additional revenues steadily
building up its core support. This raises revenue
through game-day gate receipts and merchan-
dise. Additionally, as the NFL has increased
its market reach over the sample period, with
regular season games occurring internationally,
in the United kingdom and Mexico, the more
successful teams are the better positioned teams
to attract new international support. Addition-
ally, support for the public subsidization of NFL
infrastructure and franchise stadia is arguably
related to the intensity of local support. But to
what extent is winning important in this revenue
development? Vrooman (1995) estimates a 3-
year win elasticity over the period 1990–1992
of .12, which implies if the average win rate
doubles over these 4 years franchise revenues
would increase by 12%. Vrooman (1995) and
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TABLE 7
Franchise Revenues and Income
Revenue Book Value Operating Income
Year N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Salary Cap
2000 31 $116.20m 19.61 $423.45m 107.45 $15.54m 15.20 $62.17m
2005 32 $188.41m 26.41 $818.97m 134.61 $32.43m 13.14 $85.50m
2008 32 $221.56m 26.73 $1,040.00m 177.92 $24.66m 12.30 $116.00m
2009 32 $236.66m 27.60 $1,042.50m 188.63 $32.26m 20.54 $123.00m
2010 32 $250.50m 41.34 $1,022.44m 223.83 $33.31m 29.57 —
2011 32 $260.78m 39.06 $1,036.31m 237.50 $30.60m 23.30 $120.00m
2012 32 $275.72m 55.13 $1,106.72m 284.43 $41.11m 44.50 $120.60m
2013 32 $286.47m 60.85 $1,165.47m 316.56 $44.03m 48.18 $123.00m
2014 32 $299.22m 63.46 $1,427.81m 532.47 $53.32m 50.35 $133.00m
2015 32 $346.59m 69.52 $1966.96m 628.05 $76.21m 50.45 $143.28m
2016 32 $379.91m 75.98 $2,338.44m 570.12 $91.53m 52.51 $155.27m
2017 32 $411.13m 92.76 $2,522.03m 626.20 $101.38m 58.96 $167.00m
% change 254% 496% 483% 169%
Notes: 1. NFL franchises owners opted out of the collective bargaining agreement in 2010 that provides for the salary cap. 2.
There is a mechanical relationship between league wide revenues and the salary cap under the NFL’s collective bargaining
agreement between the NFL franchises and the player’s union the NFLPA. Under the current agreement, the salary cap is
approximately 48.5% of total league revenues.
Source: Forbes.
Bradbury (2019) show that NFL revenues are
considerably less win elastic than the other
major U.S. sports. However, if measured over
a longer period of time, the arguments laid out
in (Vrooman 2012) would imply higher win
elasticities.
Table 8 shows the impact of winning on fran-
chise book values and revenues as measured by
a rolling average of the franchise’s win percent-
age between 2000 and 2017. Column 1 reports
the unconditional coefficient suggesting a 10 per-
centage point increase in the rolling win rate
is associated with approximately $50m in the
annual book value over the sample period. A
10% point increase is equal to the median 8-8
team improving to 9.6 wins on average period
season, which is coincidentally almost exactly
a one standard deviation increase. A two stan-
dard deviation increase is broadly equivalent to
an 11-5 season on average and worth approxi-
mately $100m in book value and $30m in revenue
per annum. Therefore, a single win in the regu-
lar season would be worth c.$10m per annum, on
average in the long run. Recall, from the estimates
in Section 4.1, a win would need to be worth
approximately $10m for the median QB wages to
be equal to their marginal revenue product. Even
allowing for a degree of imprecision in these
regression estimates it is remarkable that such
a tight connection between wages and marginal
revenue product has emerged.21
21. It should be noted that the threats to identifica-
tion such as reverse causality and omitted variable bias that
Columns 2 and 5 demonstrate the result is
robust to the inclusion of a wide set of observable
controls22 while columns 3 and 6 control for
unobserved franchise fixed effects. The set of
year dummies capture the growth in book values
and revenues reported in Table 7 and contribute
to the high R2 values.
C. Wages and Productivity: Heterogeneity
between Rookies and Veterans
From the estimates in Section 4.1, a win
needed to be worth $10m for the median
QB wages to be approximately equal to their
motivated the empirical strategy in the first stage are not
as critical when estimating how much a win is worth. With
respect to reverse causality, the ability of higher revenue
franchises to increase their win-rate is significantly curtailed
by the operation of the hard salary cap. With respect to
time-varying heterogeneity, the fundamental heterogeneity
between franchises that drives revenue potential is the size
of the population in the local metropolitan area (Fort and
Quirk 1995) and this is stable over time. The largest fran-
chises in 2000 (Dallas Cowboys, New York Giants) remain
the largest franchises in 2017. What drives the majority of
variation in revenue is the win-rate of the franchise and the
demand for the media product which is common to all fran-
chises. As a consequence, the simple ordinary least squares
analysis in Table 8 is able to account for a very large pro-
portion of the variation in franchise revenues over the sample
period. Moreover, since the salary cap is mechanically tied to
league revenue growth, one can be confident that the relation-
ship between winning and revenue will hold as the nominal
value of a win changes in the future due to market growth.
22. The set of control variables in Table 8 are also inter-
esting. A set of controls for the initial conditions of the
franchise in 1995 are included to capture long term legacy
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TABLE 8
Sensitivity of Winning to Revenues and Book Values
Book Value Revenue
OLS (1) OLS (2) FE (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) FE (6)
Rolling win percentage 498*** 352*** 377*** 152*** 85.8*** 147***
(4.52) (3.67) (2.69) (4.65) (3.58) (3.18)
Initial conditions in 1995
No. wins 0.33 −0.059
(0.77) (−0.64)
No. Super Bowls 63.0*** 13.6***
(7.14) (7.11)
No. post season years 1.94 1.28*
(0.55) (1.70)





Ln (total build cost) 71.0*** 15.9***
(6.50) (5.67)
New stadium 108*** 252*** 21.8*** 45.3***
(4.68) (8.99) (3.95) (7.15)
Yrs since expansion −3.66** −0.36
(−2.31) (−0.86)
Metropolitan area controls
Ln population 49.5*** 7.44**
(3.31) (2.37)
Population growth rate −4.16 −3.52
(−0.27) (−1.05)
Only franchise 295*** 72.0***
(7.41) (8.31)
Main franchise 118** 12.5
(2.20) (1.08)
No. substitutes 60.6*** 16.2***
(4.20) (5.14)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 721 721 721 383 383 383
R2 0.835 0.899 0.912 0.694 0.867 0.905
No. teams 32 32 32 32 32 32
Notes: 1. Book values available 1995–2017. Revenues available for 2000, 2005, 2008–2017. 2. All monetary variables in
December 2017 prices. 3. The estimated coefficient in column 3 and 6 implies 10 percentage point increase in the rolling win
rate increases book values by $50M and revenues by $15M respectively. 4. The R2 range between 69.4% and 91.2%. These high
values are due to the large growth in franchise book values and revenues that occurred over the sample period. This this growth
is captured by the set of year dummies. Excluding the year dummies reduces the R2 to between 0.4% and 46.2%.
effects. The total number of historical wins and the age of the
franchise do not impact book value or revenue but a histori-
cal Super Bowl win is worth approximately $63M ($13M in
revenue). The stadium variables are statistically and economi-
cally significant. An extra 1,000 in capacity is associated with
$10M in value and $3M in revenue. More expensive stadia
raise revenues and book values (a 10% increase in build cost is
associated with $7M in book value and any stadia related debt
is excluded from the book values). Building a new stadium
in the franchise period is associated with $252M of value on
average for that franchise (FE estimate) and each year the sta-
dia is not renewed costs the franchise $3.6M in book value.
Turning to the Metropolitan area controls: a 10% increase in
local population is associated with c.$5M in franchise value
albeit the growth rate of the local area does not impact fran-
chise values. Holding a monopoly over the local metropoli-
tan area is worth $295M relative to secondary franchises in
the area (e.g., the New York Jets) and $177M more than
primary franchises (e.g., the New York Giants). The num-
ber of substitute franchises from the other three main sports,
marginal revenue product and the estimates
above suggest this is the case. However, it is
important to emphasize that the estimates of
marginal productivity are derived from point
estimates at the mean. As such, it can be stated
with reasonable confidence that QBs close to the
mean of the wage distribution appear to be paid
their close to their marginal revenue product.
However, this result may mask heterogeneity
Baseball, Basketball, andHockey is positively associatedwith
NFL franchise values and revenues. This reflects the fact that
franchise location is endogenous in the United States and
there are several examples of NFL franchises relocating to
higher demand local areas. In sports outside of the United
States, such as the English Premier League, team location is
more plausibly exogenous and one might expect an inverse
correlation between revenues and the number of substitute
sporting events in the local area.
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in the relationship between wages and produc-
tivity elsewhere in the distribution. As shown
in Section 3, there is a wide distribution of
wages both within the QB position and between
QBs and other positions. To what extent can
these differences be explained by differences in
productivity?
There are reasons to suspect that some play-
ers represent better value for money than others.
In particular, an important institutional friction of
the NFL is a player’s eligibility for free agency.
Newly drafted players out of college, known as
“rookies,” are not free to leave the franchise to
which they are drafted under the terms of their
first contract which typically lasts 4 years. After
serving their rookie contract, players become
unrestricted “free agents.”23 The franchise how-
ever can cut a player at any time. Although
rookies can try to renegotiate the terms of their
rookie contract before their contract is over, there
remains a considerable difference in bargaining
power between rookies and veteran players. Fur-
thermore, veterans are in short supply because
many rookies will leave the NFL before being eli-
gible for free agency, either because they have
a career ending injury or, more likely, because
they fail to make the roster of their franchise.
This has been highlighted by Vrooman (2012,
8) who argues “It is common for veteran play-
ers to coalesce with management to bargain
away the rights of future generations of disen-
franchised rookies and forgotten former players.
This creates a twisted bilateral monopoly where
veteran players are often overpaid because of
upper-tier monopoly power, while rookies are
exploited because of owners” lower-tier monop-
sony power’.
Table 9 shows the impact of being a rookie on
wages across all positions and within each posi-
tion. Rookies are paid 46% (exp(0.62)− 1) less
on average than veteran players. It is important to
note that this difference remains after controlling
for individual productivity and team level fixed
effects. Productivity up to the season in which
wages are determined is captured by the “approx-
imate value” (AV) metric. This metric is sup-
plied by sports-reference.com and accounts for
the points achieved (conceded) per drive and dis-
tributes these points based on the contribution of
the player, in their position, to those points.While
AV is indeed “approximate” and between posi-
tion comparisons are noisy, it is an objective and
23. Under current rules, franchises are also allowed
to restrict the movement of one free agent known as the
“franchise tag.”
verifiable measure of every player’s productiv-
ity for each season that they play and is consis-
tentlymeasuredwithin position and overtime. AV
is recorded on a scale of 0–26, with the mean of
4 and a standard deviation of 3.72. Therefore a
one standard deviation in productivity results in
an increase in wages of approximately 44%. It is
also noteworthy that there is no impact of being
placed on injured reserve. This shows that the
wages of injured players are indeed honored for
the year and that the exclusion restriction requir-
ing that wages do not predict injuries appears
to hold. Overall, the large differences in rookie
and veterans wages cannot be solely explained
by differences in their productivity. Given that it
was argued above that the median player is being
paid close to their marginal revenue product, it is
highly likely that rookies, (on average), are below
their marginal product and veterans above it. This
is consistent with monopsonistic exploitation of
rookies as advanced by Vrooman (2012).
Alternatively, underpayment relative to
marginal revenue product for rookies and
overpayment for veterans could reflect a non-
exploitative model of deferred compensation
as in (Lazear 1979). One possible view of the
large increase to player wages that occurs when
players become free agents is as an incentive
mechanism for players to exert full effort both
before and after free agency. As rookies, players
exert effort to maximize their marketability
when they enter free agency. If less than full
effort is supplied the rookie risks dropping out
of the league before their big pay day. After
entering free agency, veterans will also exert
full effort because pay at their franchise would
exceed their outside option of their marginal
product and so do not want to risk being traded.
Rookies are not exploited in this model because
the optional value of deferred compensation
offsets the underpayment in wages. However,
deferred compensation contracts are more read-
ily applicable to working environments where
monitoring productivity is prohibitively costly
(Huck, Seltzer, and Wallace 2011). Because
rookie performances are easily observed and
under-performing rookies easily dismissed, it
is hard to explain why a franchise would need
to adopt this incentive mechanism. Moreover,
deferred compensation contracts are expensive.
Given the high degree of uncertainty associated
with surviving until free agency rookies will
discount the optional value of the free agency
pay-day by a considerable amount. A precise
estimate of the option value is difficult because
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TABLE 9
Wages: Rookies Versus Veterans
All QB D Line D Cover LB O Line RB WR
Rookie −0.62*** −0.53*** −0.48*** −0.63*** −0.60*** −0.65*** −0.39*** −0.63***
(−20.0) (−3.92) (−7.19) (−8.97) (−10.0) (−14.3) (−4.22) (−6.62)
ApproximateValuet − 1 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.099*** 0.096*** 0.18***
(16.4) (4.98) (8.17) (8.81) (8.93) (8.29) (4.55) (7.90)
ProBowlt − 1 0.32*** −0.072 0.40*** 0.23 0.17 0.35*** 0.41** 0.28**
(6.82) (−0.41) (4.75) (1.40) (1.39) (3.41) (2.08) (2.35)
Injury reserve 0.0099 −0.061 0.19*** −0.037 0.015 −0.0087 −0.26*** 0.014
(0.38) (−0.23) (3.62) (−0.71) (0.26) (−0.18) (−3.14) (0.20)
No.gamest − 1 0.018*** 0.0086 0.013** 0.036*** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.0027 −0.0083
(7.18) (0.46) (2.22) (4.58) (2.26) (3.39) (0.27) (−0.73)
Draft round (first round omitted)
Second round −0.38*** −0.36 −0.37*** −0.22 −0.35*** −0.36*** −0.37* −0.25
(−9.27) (−1.59) (−4.31) (−1.65) (−2.97) (−3.75) (−1.76) (−1.66)
Third round −0.60*** −0.85*** −0.45*** −0.37*** −0.78*** −0.67*** −0.49** −0.24
(−11.6) (−2.85) (−3.81) (−3.29) (−8.16) (−5.31) (−2.58) (−1.34)
Fourth round −0.60*** −0.95** −0.51*** −0.28** −0.73*** −0.61*** −0.76*** −0.56***
(−10.1) (−2.67) (−4.22) (−2.18) (−6.30) (−5.93) (−3.11) (−2.79)
Fifth round −0.74*** −1.24*** −0.68*** −0.32** −0.99*** −0.96*** −0.73*** −0.53***
(−10.5) (−2.89) (−6.71) (−2.13) (−5.05) (−8.98) (−2.94) (−2.80)
Sixth round −0.76*** −0.60** −0.53*** −0.41*** −1.02*** −0.87*** −0.70*** −0.043
(−13.1) (−2.44) (−3.51) (−2.88) (−7.52) (−6.41) (−2.91) (−0.13)
Seventh round −0.83*** 0.10 −0.87*** −0.62*** −1.05*** −0.83*** −0.65*** −0.31
(−14.7) (0.33) (−6.49) (−5.32) (−9.92) (−5.64) (−3.49) (−1.34)
Position dummies Yes — — — — — —
Team fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,928 193 746 616 596 946 314 406
R2 0.548 0.686 0.587 0.552 0.592 0.531 0.511 0.585
Notes: 1. The dependent variable is the natural log of the variable “CAPHIT” which is the official amount of wages charged
to the franchise’s salary cap for the year. 2. Rookie is a dummy identifying players on restricted contracts which typically last
4 or 5 years. Most players enter the league at 21/22 years old and so players are typically 25/26 when they enter free agency.
The estimates imply that overall rookies are paid c.46% less than veterans for the same level of performance as measured by
their approximate value, albeit this varies by position. Approximate value is supplied by sports-reference.com and combines
detailed information about on the field performances of players at all positions. Probowl identifies players who were invited to
the Pro Bowl which celebrates the best players in the two leagues (AFC and NFC) in that season. 3. There is a tight relationship
between draft pick order and rookie wages because initial wages in the first year out of the draft are set by collective bargaining.
Undrafted players are excluded from the analysis because they immediately become free agents but did not make the draft
selection. t statistics in parentheses (adjusted for clustering at team level). *p< 0.1; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
survival rates vary significantly by player quality
and will be distorted by idiosyncratic risk prefer-
ences. However, using the draft pick as a proxy
for player quality, 77.4% of first round picks
survive 4 years, while only 21.7% of seventh
round picks survive. 34.3% of the median draft
pick survives 4 years in the league.24 Therefore
the c.46% wage premium that veterans enjoy on
average relative to rookies will be discounted by
average rookie by approximately 65% (assuming
risk neutrality). As such it is safe to conclude
that most rookies are underpaid relative to their
marginal product even considering the option




is observed that players move regularly between
franchises when they enter free agency implying
that their current franchise is not prepared to
offer them a veteran contract above their out-
side option, which would be required under the
deferred compensation model.
V. CONCLUSION
The estimates obtained here for the marginal
productivity of NFL players suggests that,
notwithstanding heterogeneity between rookies
and veteran players, sportsmen in the NFL are
paid, on average, at a rate which is very close
to their marginal contribution to the franchise’s
revenue. This was identified by observing the lost
value from the reduction in win probability from
injured players being approximately equal to the
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wages earned by those injured players. A dollar
of injured talent is a dollar of productivity lost.
This result provides empirical support for models
of sporting leagues such as (Fort and Quirk 1995)
where talent is hired at a market clearing rate
which is also equal to the firm’s marginal revenue
of talent. More generally, it provides evidence for
a tight connection between wages and productiv-
ity even when specific institutional constraints,
in this case a salary cap and restricted rookie
contracts, act to hold down wages for some
workers. The connection between wages and
marginal revenue product appears remarkably
robust despite these frictions.
The unique institutional features of the
NFL that permit identification of the wage-
productivity relationship unfortunately also limit
the scope of the analysis to generalize to other
industries. Labor markets with highly talented
workers whose injury significantly reduces
firm-level productivity and where bilateral bar-
gaining over wages occurs probably represent the
closet domain outside of professional sportsmen.
Indeed, executive labor markets are also subject
to regulatory frictions and while there is no
cap on executive wages, it has been argued that
political scrutiny of high profile executives can
act as a soft constraint (Murphy 1999).
An opportunity to extend the research here is
to build a dataset that links the timing of an on-
field injury to the real time movement of in-play
betting odds.While historical in-play odds are not
currently publicly available, private betting com-
panies own datasets containing such information.
This would provide an unambiguous connection
between the injury to the player and the change
in the probability of winning the game. If access
to such data was opened up to academics for
research purposes, this would allow one to more
precisely identify the immediate impact of injury
on the probability of winning by using the market
reaction as a close proxy for the change in proba-
bility. These movements could then be compared
the player’s wages.
A second opportunity to build upon the
research here would be to explore the role of
nonproductivity related characteristics such as
the race of the player. Although race is not
identified in this data, the NFLPA collects self-
identified demographic information on NFL
players. If access to this data was made avail-
able to academics, given the detailed individual
level data on productivity already in the public
domain, it would be possible to determine the
extent to which race played or continues to play a
role in the wages of NFL players and the success
of NFL franchises.
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